This paper develops a theory of probabilistic models for risky choices. This theory can be viewed as an extension of the expected utility theory. One probabilistic version of the Archimedean Axiom and two versions of the Independence Axiom are proposed. In addition, additional axioms are proposed of which one is Luce's Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives. It is demonstrated that different combinations of the axioms yield different characterizations of the probabilities for choosing the respective risky prospects. An interesting feature of the models developed is that they allow for violations of the expected utility theory known as the common consequence effect and the common ratio effect.
Introduction
In the standard theory of decision making under uncertainty, it is assumed that the agent's preference functional is deterministic. This assumption is maintained in most of the recent theoretical and empirical literature. It has been recognized for some time, however, that even in seemingly identical repetitions (replications) of the same choice setting, the decision maker often makes different choices, cf. Tversky (1969) . This means that the deterministic theory cannot be applied directly in an empirical context unless some additional stochastic "error" is introduced. As Fishburn (1976 Fishburn ( , 1978 , Hey (1995) , Carbone (1997) , Sugden (1995, 1998) and Starmer (2000) discuss, this raises the question of how axiomatization of theories for choice under uncertainty should be extended to accommodate stochastic error. This paper proposes an axiomatic foundation of probabilistic models for risky choice experiments that may be viewed, in part, as a generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. This setting means that the agent's choice behavior in replications of choice settings (with uncertain outcomes) is assumed to be governed by a probability mechanism. The motivation for this generalization is twofold. First, as mentioned above, it is of interest to establish a probabilistic framework that is justified on theoretical grounds and that can be used in microeconometric empirical analysis of choice behavior under uncertainty. Apart from a few rather particular cases, no such framework seems to be available. Second, it is of independent theoretical interest to extend the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory to allow for errors in the decision process of the agents. There is a huge literature on stochastic choice models with certain outcomes; see, for example, chapter 2 in Anderson, Palma and Thisse (1992) and Fishburn (1998) for reviews of discrete choice models. In fact, it was empirical observations of inconsistencies, dating back to Thurstone (1927a,b) , that led to the study of probabilistic theories in the first place. Thurstone argued that one reason for observed inconsistent choice behavior is bounded rationality in the sense that the agent is viewed as having difficulties with assessing the precise value (to him or her) of the choice objects.
Whereas probabilistic models for certain outcomes have been studied and applied extensively in psychology and economics, it seems that there has been less interest in developing corresponding models for choice with uncertain outcomes. (For a summary of models with uncertain outcomes, see Fishburn (1998) and Starmer (2000, Section 6.2) .) This is somewhat curious, as one would expect that if an agent has problems with rank ordering alternatives with certain outcomes, he or she would most certainly find it difficult to choose among lotteries.
The importance of developing theoretically justified stochastic choice models for uncertain outcomes has been articulated by Harless and Camerer (1994) and Hey and Orme (1994) . For example, Hey and Orme summarize their view as follows:
"... we are tempted to conclude by saying that our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably well modeled (to what might be termed a 'reasonable approximation') as 'Expected utility plus noise'.
Perhaps we should now spend some time thinking about the noise, rather than about even more alternatives to expected utility?" (pp. 1321-1322) .
In this paper, we consider a generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility theory. 1 We first restate axioms known from the theoretical literature on probabilistic choice, which are known as the Solvability condition, the Balance condition, the Quadruple condition and the Independence from Irrelevant alternative condition (IIA). The Solvability, Balance and Quadruple conditions were originally proposed by Debreu (1958) . Subsequently, we propose an axiom that can be viewed as a probabilistic version of the so-called Archimedean Axiom, and two axioms than can be viewed as probabilistic versions of the Independence Axiom in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of expected utility. These probabilistic versions extend the basic von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms in the following sense: whereas the Archimedean and Independence Axioms may not necessarily hold in a single-choice experiment, the probabilistic versions state that they will hold in an aggregate sense (to be made precise below) when the agent participates in a large number of replications of a choice experiment. A Thurstonian type of intuition is that the agent may be boundedly rational and make errors when he or she evaluates the value to him or her of the respective choice alternatives (strategies) in each single replication of the experiment, but on average (across replications of the experiment), the agent shows no systematic departure from the von Neumann-Morgenstern type of axioms.
Alternatively, the probabilistic axioms may be conveniently interpreted in the context of an observationally homogeneous population of agents that face the same choice experiment. Whereas each agent's behavior is allowed to deviate from the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, the "aggregate" behavior in the population is assumed to be consistent with these axioms. The latter type of interpretation is analogous to the most common one within the theory of discrete choice (see, for example, McFadden, 1981 McFadden, , 1984 .
We demonstrate that different combinations of the probabilistic Archimedean and Independence Axioms, combined with the other axiom mentioned above, imply particular characterizations of the probabilities for choice among risky prospects as a function of the lottery outcome probabilities.
As a particular case within our generalized Expected Utility theory, we study settings with monetary rewards. What distinguishes this case from the general situation is that the outcomes (money) are realizations of an ordered variable. Accordingly, it is possible to use this property to obtain additional characterization of the model. The (additional) axiom that yields this characterization states the following: if the probability of preferring lottery one over lottery two is less than the probability of preferring lottery three over lottery four, this inequality remains true when all outcomes are rescaled by the same factor while the lottery outcome probabilities remain unchanged.
In an empirical context, the choice probabilities implied by the proposed axioms in this paper (1978) , and Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) . Fishburn (1978) develops the incremental expected utility advantage model. His model does not contain the expected utility model as a special case, although the expected utility model can be approximated by an incremental expected utility advantage model.
As pointed out by Fishburn (1978, pp. 635-636) , the incremental advantage model seems extreme as it implies that there is a positive probability of choosing $1 in a choice between $1 for certain or a gamble that yields $10 000 with probability .999 or $0 with probability .001. Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) define a random utility function to be a probability measure on some set of utility functions which they take to be von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. They identify properties of random choice rules that ensure the existence of such a random utility function. Although Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) have established important existence results in a very general setting, they have not provided explicit characterization of choice probabilities. In contrast, the theory developed in the present paper does not require the a priori assumption that utilities are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. As described above, our alternative approach is based on particular probabilistic versions of the von NeumannMorgenstern axioms. When additional assumptions (such as the IIA, the Balance -and the Quadruple conditions) are imposed, it is demonstrated that explicit functional form characterizations follow. Allais (1953) argued that individuals may systematically violate the expected utility theory.
His examples have later been viewed as special cases of phenomena called the common consequence effect and the common ratio effect. It is interesting that the stochastic version of the expected utility theory developed here in fact allows for the common consequence and the common ratio effects.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some basic concepts and notation. In Section 3, we discuss the generalization of the Expected Utility theory. In Section 4, we specialize to the case with monetary rewards, and in Section 5, we discuss a random utility representation. However, in this paper we only demonstrate the existence of a random utility functional in the case where IIA holds for choices among lotteries .
In Section 6, we show that the models developed are able to rationalize the common consequence effect and the common ratio effect.
Preliminaries
The aim of this section is to introduce axioms that enable us to characterize choice among lotteries when some randomness is present in the agent's choice.
Let X denote the set that indexes the set of outcomes, which is assumed to be finite and to contain m outcomes, i.e., The interpretation is that P B (A) is the probability that the agent will choose a lottery within A when B is the choice set.
Probabilistic extensions of the expected utility theory
We start by restating an axiom that is originally due to Debreu (1958) . This axiom is crucial because it ensures a cardinal utility representation in the context of stochastic choice models. 
where K is a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function on R, and f is a suitable mapping from S to R. Clearly, the choice model in this example satisfies the Quadruple condition. The example shows that when the average value of some lottery outcome probabilities g is represented by a scale functional, f(g), in such a way that the propensity to prefer lottery outcome probabilities g 1 over g 2 is a function of the "distance", ( ) ( ) 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. In the special case with scalar representation of alternatives, proofs are given in Falmagne (1985) and Suppes et al. (1989) . However, their proofs do not apply when the lotteries are represented by vectors of lottery outcome probabilities.
Only in the special case with binary outcomes, can the lottery outcome probabilities of lottery j be represented by a scalar, namely by
The model in (3.1) is known in the literature as the Fechnerian representation (Fechner, 1860 (Fechner, /1966 , and it clearly implies that the relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation. It has the advantage of providing a cardinal utility functional representation. This model is, however, still too general to be directly useful in empirical applications because Theorem 1 is silent about the structure of the functional f and the c.d.f. K. If f is linear in the lottery outcome probabilities, we get a binary probabilistic version of the expected utility theory as a special case. Different versions of probabilistic nonexpected utility models follow as special cases with f as suitable nonlinear functionals (see for example, Starmer, 2000) . From a theoretical perspective, however, such specifications are so far ad hoc.
A crucial building block for corresponding choice probabilities in the multinomial case is the following axiom. P g = P g P A .
Axiom 2 was first proposed by Luce (1959) in the context of probabilistic choice with certain outcomes, and it is called "Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA). As is well known, it represents a probabilistic version of rationality in the following sense: Suppose the agent faces a set B of feasible lotteries. One may view the agent's choice as if it takes place in two stages. In stage one, the agent selects a subset from B, which contains the most attractive alternatives. In the second stage, he or she chooses the most preferred alternative from this subset. In the second stage, the alternatives outside the subset selected in stage one are irrelevant. Thus, rationality is associated with the property that the agent only takes into consideration the lotteries within the presented choice set. The probability that a particular set A (say) will be chosen in the first stage is P B (A), and the probability that g s is chosen (when alternatives in B\A are irrelevant) is
probability of choosing g s . As indicated above, the crucial point here is that
alternatives outside A. For the sake of interpretation, let J(B) denote the agent's chosen lottery from B.
With this notation, we can express IIA as:
The conditional probability of choosing g s given that the choice belongs to A, equals
so that IIA can be rewritten as
Whereas ( ) s P J(A) g = is the probability of choosing g s from a given choice set A, the conditional probability ( )
expresses the conditional probability of choosing g s from a given choice set B, given that the choice from B belongs to A. Clearly,
They only coincide when IIA holds.
As Axiom 2 is a probabilistic statement, it means that it represents probabilistic rationality in the sense that lotteries outside the second-stage choice set A may matter in single-choice experiments but will not affect average behavior.
Next, we introduce axioms that are intuitive probabilistic versions of the so-called
Archimedean and Independence Axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
, cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991, p. 1769) . Note that Axiom 3 is weaker than the assumption that ( ) r s P g ,g is continuous. This is because if ( )
, continuity implies that
Axiom 4 (Independence)
For all 1 2 3 g ,g ,g S ∈ , and all
Axiom 4 is a probabilistic version of the Independence Axiom in the von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility theory because it is equivalent to the statement that if 1
, cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991, p. 1769) .
Even if the binary relation given in Definition 1 satisfies Axioms 3 and 4, we would still not be able to specify choice probabilities that represent a generalization of the expected utility theory. We would at most be able to ascertain whether g r is preferred to g s (say) in the aggregate sense. 
where
and K is a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function defined on R with
( ) ( ) The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix.
Remark
Note that the formulation in (3.2) is equivalent to ( )
where K % is a continuous and strictly increasing c.d.f. on R + and h % is positive and strictly increasing.
This follows immediately from (3.2), by defining
By Theorem 2 Axioms 1, 3 and 4 yield a characterization of the binary choice probabilities up to a c.d.f., and an increasing transformation h. Thus, in an empirical setting the problem of how to select specifications of h and K remains.
Consider next the multinomial setting with S consisting of at least 3 alternatives.
Theorem 3
Assume that ( ) ( ) The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the Appendix.
The choice model obtained in Theorem 3 is a special case of the Luce model for wagers,
proposed by Becker et al. (1963) . They postulated that
where : R R + ψ → is a strictly increasing mapping that is unique up to a multiplicative constant. By letting log (x) h(x) ψ = , we find that (3.5) is equivalent to (3.4).
The model in (3.4) characterizes the choice probabilities in terms of a linear preference functional V up to an unknown monotone mapping h. However, the underlying axioms imply no additional restrictions on h.
Axiom 5 (Strong independence)
For all
) . ( )
It follows that Axiom 5 implies Axiom 4. To realize this, note that when
Thus, it follows from this and Axiom 5 that when
P g 1 g , g 1 g 1 2 α + − α α + − α ≥ , which we recognize as Axiom 4.
The intuition why Axiom 5 is stronger than Axiom 4 is related to the fact that it represents a statement that involves comparisons between the degree to which one lottery is chosen over a second and the degree to which a third lottery is chosen over a fourth. It is this strengthening that enables us to derive strong functional form restrictions on the choice probabilities, to be considered next. The proof of Theorem 4 is given in the Appendix. Note that the constant β will, as long as the c.d.f. is unspecified, be absorbed in the c.d.f. K, and it can therefore be normalized to one with no loss of generality. Similarly, the constant κ will vanish in utility comparisons and can therefore be normalized to zero.
Note that Axiom 5 is weaker that the linearity property proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) . Clearly, their linearity property assumption is equivalent to ( )
P g + 1 g , g + 1 g α −α α −α . Since this property implies Axiom 5, Theorem 4 must hold.
Hence, it follows that The axioms state that whereas the agent is allowed to make "errors" when selecting strategies in each replication of the experiment (in the sense that his or her behavior is not consistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory), the agent will still⎯in the aggregate sense specified in the axioms⎯behave according to the respective versions of the probabilistic extension of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory.
In the alternative interpretation, we consider a large observationally homogeneous population.
In this setting, each agent in the population faces the same choice experiment. Although the behavior of each individual agent may be inconsistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the axioms above state that aggregate behavior in the population will be consistent with the probabilistic version of the theory.
Monetary rewards
The setting we shall discuss here is somewhat different from the previous one in that we focus on applications where money is involved. Specifically, we now assume that the set of outcomes is a set of money amounts. Thus, the lottery outcomes of the choice experiment consist of pairs are rescaled by the same factor while the lottery outcome probabilities remain unchanged.
Before we state the next result, we adopt the definition: The intuition is, loosely speaking, that the agent is "to some degree" viewed as being indifferent with respect to scale transformations of the potential money rewards when comparing lotteries. By the above notion of "some degree", it is meant that the respective binary choice probabilities may change as a result of the rescaling of rewards, but only in such a way that the original inequality of Axiom 6 is preserved. The proof of Theorem 5 is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 5

Axioms 1, 3, 4 and 6 hold if and only if the choice probabilities have the form as in (3.2) with
either (i)( ) ( ) ( ) x
Axiom 7
Let 1 2 g ,g S. ∈ Then ( ) ( )
for any real number > 0 λ and k w W, k X. ∈ ∈ Axiom 7 is stronger than Axiom 6 because it postulates that the choice probabilities are invariant under scale transformations of the rewards. This means that the agent is viewed as being indifferent with respect to rescaling of the potential money rewards. The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the appendix. Note that when 1 β = , the choice model in Corollary 2 (ii) reduces to the so-called Strict Expected Utility model for uncertain outcomes proposed by Luce and Suppes (1965) .
Corollary 2
Axioms 1, 3, 4 and 7 hold if and only if the choice probabilities have the form as in (
Corollary 3
Axioms 2, 3, 4 and 6 hold if and only if the choice model (3.4) holds with h and u as in
Theorem 5.
Proof
The "if" part of the corollary is evident. Consider the "only if" part. Recall that Axioms 2, 3 and 4 imply Theorem 3. As Axiom 1 is implied by Axiom 2, the conditions of Theorem 5 are fulfilled, and thus the structure of h and u must be as in (i), (ii) or (iii) of Theorem 5.
Q.E.D. 
Q.E.D.
The next result is analogous to Corollary 3 and follows from Corollary 4. For given g S, P g ,g 0,1 for all g S, P g P g P A , g A B, A,B ∈ ∈ ∈ = ∈ ⊂ ∈ B .
Corollary 5
Axioms 2, 3, 5 and 6 hold if and only if the choice model (3.4) holds with h and u as in
Axiom 3
If ( ) ( ) 
Axiom 4
( ) 
Figure 1 (cont). Overview of axioms
Axiom 5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
P g ,g P g ,g , 0 
with h and K strictly increasing, symmetric and continuous.
Axioms 1, 3, 5
with K strictly increasing, symmetric and continuous. β > Figures 1-4 display a convenient overview and summary of the results obtained in the paper.
It is an important feature of the axioms that they have direct empirical counterparts. Figures 3 and 4 emphasize the equivalences between sets of axioms and the structure of the respective choice probabilities. However, some of these choice probabilities depend on unknown functional forms (f, K and h). For example, all the binary choice probabilities depend on an unknown c.d.f. K. Only Corollaries 1, 3 and 5 yield fully specified functional forms for the choice probabilities. As all the axioms have explicit empirical counterparts, they can be applied to test these models without relying on ad hoc functional form specifications. To carry out rigorous nonparametric tests of these axioms is in itself a complicated task. In fact, it seems that the general case with ordinal restrictions on choice probabilities of the type displayed in Figure 1 lies outside the scope of a large body of literature devoted to statistical hypotheses testing under ordinal constraints. As far as we know, only Iverson and Falmagne (1985) and Dagsvik and Røine (2006) have explicitly addressed the challenge of developing test procedures for this type of setting. In particular, Iverson and Falmagne (1985) discuss how one can test property (i) of Axiom 1 within a maximum likelihood setting.
A random utility representation
In this section, we shall consider the problem of a random utility representation of the agent's preferences over lotteries that yield choice probabilities satisfying Axioms 2, 3 and 4. From the theory of discrete choice, we know that the Luce choice model is consistent with an additive random utility representation in which the error terms are independent (across alternatives) with extreme value c.d.f., ( )
. Here, the setting is not as simple as in the standard discrete choice case because S is not countable and g is a vector. Therefore, if a random utility representation { } U(g), g S ∈ exists, it must be a multiparameter stochastic process, i.e., a random field.
Theorem 6 (Random utility representation)
There exist a probability space and random variables ( ) { } Note that the random utility representation given here depends on the choice model satisfying IIA. As mentioned in the introduction, Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) have proven the existence of a random utility representation under different assumptions.
Remark
The distribution function given in (5.1) is a so-called type III extreme value distribution. 
The Allais paradox
Starting with Allais (1953) , it has long been known that people's behavior under uncertainty may systematically violate the Independence axiom in the expected utility theory. The examples that Allais To explain what these phenomena mean, let g 1 and g 2 be two lotteries with binary outcomes such that lottery one has payoff y with probability g and payoff c with probability 1 g − . Lottery two has payoff q with probability g and payoff c with probability 1 g − , where q is also a lottery that has payoff x with probability μ and payoff 0 x with probability 1 ,0 1 − μ < μ < . The expected utilities of the first and second lotteries, 1 2 V ,V , are
The payoffs are nonnegative (usually monetary) consequences such that 2 1 0 x x x > < . Note that both lotteries yield payoff c with probability 1 g − . This is the "common consequence". As A second type of phenomenon, also discussed by Allais, is called the common ratio effect. To explain what this means, consider lotteries three and four, where lottery three has payoff x 2 with probability g and payoff x 0 with probability 1 g − . Lottery four has payoff x 1 with probability μg and payoff x 0 with probability 1 g − μ , where 2 1 0 x x x > > . The corresponding expected utilities are:
Evidently, 3 4 V V , > irrespective of the value of g. However, experimental evidence indicates that when μ is fixed, individuals reveal a tendency to switch towards lottery four as g decreases.
Let us now consider these phenomena in the present case with probabilistic choice, and under the Axioms 1, 3 and 4. Then, the choice probability of preferring lottery 1 over lottery 2 is given by:
From this expression, we realize that the choice probability will depend on the common consequence c, provided the mapping h is nonlinear. Although
owing to the fact that ( )
+ − μ , the fraction that prefers lottery two is less than 1 2 but may be close to 1 2 . Similarly
In this case, the choice probability will depend on g and 0 x even if h is linear. Also, in this case:
Thus, we realize that with probabilistic models, such as the ones developed in this paper, the common consequence and common ratio effect may occur for less than 50 per cent of the population.
Only under Axioms 1, 3 and 5 does the common consequence effect vanish. The common ratio effect will only vanish when h(x) log x = β +κ and 0 x 0 = .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theory of probabilistic choice for risky choices based on different combinations of particular axioms. First, we have considered choice models with "minimal" structure on the choice probabilities. Second, we have generalized the expected utility theory to a probabilistic version. We have explored the relationship between sets of axioms and the structure of the corresponding choice probabilities. In particular, some sets of axioms imply a complete characterization of the functional form of the choice probabilities. The case in which the outcomes are money amounts is given particular attention, and it is demonstrated that particular invariance axioms that may apply in this setting yield an explicit characterization of the functional form of the model.
An interesting property of the models is that they rationalize the so-called common consequence effect and the common ratio effect.
As most of the axioms proposed are nonparametric, they can be utilized to carry out nonparametric tests of the respective structures of the choice probabilities.
where the inequality on one side is strict if and only if the inequality on the other side is strict. From (A.1), it follows that g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and g 4 satisfy ( ) ( )
. However, this means that we can write
for some suitable function K. Evidently, K(x) is strictly increasing and takes values in [0, 1] . Without loss of generality, it can be chosen to be a cumulative distribution function. The Balance condition implies that K(x) K( x) 1 + − = , which means that K is symmetric. Recall that a cumulative distribution function is continuous to the right. As K is symmetric, it must also be continuous to the left. Hence, K is continuous. 
To prove that I is an interval, let 0 g S ∈ be a fixed point of reference. Let 1 2 g ,g S ∈ be such that ( ) ( )
, and let
By Axiom 2 (ii), there exists a
Therefore, x I ∈ . Hence, we have proved that I is an interval.
Q.E.D.
In the proof of Theorem 2 below we need the following well known result:
Let f % be a binary relation. The following two conditions are equivalent: 
represents the preference relation.
Lemma 1 is the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem, cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991) , pp. 1769-70.
Proof of Theorem 2
When the choice probabilities given in Theorem 2 hold, then Axioms 1, 3 and 4 are satisfied.
Consider the "only if" part. Debreu (1958) proved that Axiom 1 implies that there exists a mapping f from S to some interval such that for 1 2 3 4 g , g , g , g S ∈ ( ) ( ) 
f g h V g = .
As Axiom 1 implies Theorem 1, we can combine (A.3) and (3.1), from which we get the desired result. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, V(⋅) is unique up to a linear transformation. As evidently f(⋅) must also be unique up to a linear transformation, we obtain the restrictions on ( )
Proof of Theorem 3
It follows immediately that the "if" part of the theorem is true. Consider the "only if" part. 
log a g h V g = ,
for some strictly increasing function h.
Proof of Theorem 4
Note first that when choice probabilities are given as in Theorem 4, it follows readily that Axioms 1, 3 and 5 are satisfied. Note next that when Axiom 5 holds, if P g ,g P g ,g and P g ,g P g ,g ≥ ≤ .
When applying Axiom 5 twice, with the inequality sign reversed the second time, we obtain (A.5). 
where K % and h % are defined by ( )
, where h 0 > % is a strictly increasing function defined on R.
By (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we have that whenever
Hence, by (A.12) and (A.13) (A.14) ( ) 14) is a functional equation of the Cauchy type. As f α (u) is strictly increasing, the only possible solution of (A.14) is given by
where c(α) is a function of α; see, for example, Falmagne (1985) , Theorem 3.4.
Recall that h( ) ⋅ % is unique only up to a multiplicative constant. Therefore, h( ) ⋅ % can be normalized such that h(1) 1 = % . From (A.11) and (A.15), with 1 x x = and 2 x 1 = , we obtain that:
where h is defined on [0,1]. In the following, it will be convenient to organize the rest of the proof into two cases depending on whether or not c(α) is a constant.
Case (i). c(α) is a constant.
In this case (A.16) yields, by symmetry where β and κ are constants; see, for example, Falmagne (1985) , Theorem 3.4.
Case (ii). c(α) is not a constant.
In this case, there is at least one α, say α 0 , such that ( ) 0 c 1 α ≠ . Hence, (A.16) leads to: 
Suppose that 1 γ ≠ . Then, (A.25) implies that 1 2 x x = , which is a contradiction. We therefore conclude that 1 γ = , i.e., (A.26) 
Recall that the normalization h(1) 0 = we adopted above was made purely for notational convenience so that the general form of h is 0 h(x) b x = +κ, where κ is an arbitrary constant.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
As Axiom 5 implies Axiom 4, it follows from Theorem 3 that (3.4) must hold. Consider the special case with
In this case, (3.4) reduces to a special case of (3.2) with
Hence, Theorem 4 applies and implies (3.6). Without loss of generality, we can set 0 κ = and 1 β = because κ cancels and β is absorbed in the utilities { } u(k) in the expression for the choice probability.
Corollary 1 represents the most satisfactory model so far, in the sense that the choice probabilities are characterized completely in terms of a linear preference functional (3.3) of the respective lottery outcome probabilities. This is a rather strong result, and it is achieved at the cost of strong assumptions such as Axioms 2 and 5. In the special case with binary comparisons, i.e.,
{ }
1 2 B g ,g = , the Luce model is not particularly restrictive. Thus, in this case, Axiom 5 is the most objectionable assertion because it implies the Independence Axiom (Axiom 4).
Proof of Theorem 5
Note first that it follows immediately that when (i) or (ii) in Theorem 5 hold, then Axioms 1, 3, 4 and 6 are true. We shall next prove that (i) or (ii) is also necessary. Recall that the utility function u(k,w) and the transformation h(x) characterize the preferences and are independent of the lottery outcome probabilities. Without loss of generality, we consider lotteries with only two outcomes, that is, lottery j has outcome ( ) 
